PRICE VOLATILITY, RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS, AND BUBBLES
The history of thought in financial markets has shown a surprising lack of consensus about a very fundamental question: what ultimately causes all those fluctuations in the price of speculative assets like corporate stocks, commodities, or real estate? One might think that so basic a question would have long ago been confidently answered. But the answer to this question is not so easily found. 3 At the same time, there has been an equally widespread acceptance in other quarters of the idea that markets are substantially driven by psychology. Indeed, since 1991 Richard Thaler and I have been directors of the National Bureau of Economic Research program in behavioral economics, which has featured hundreds of papers that seem mostly at odds with a general sense of rationality in the markets. 4 The term "speculative bubble" is often used and applied carelessly. The word "bubble" first became popular at the time of the Mississippi Bubble in European stock markets that came to an end in the 1720, a time often mentioned as one of craziness, but whether that was best described as a time of wild irrationality still remains controversial, see Garber (2000) and Goetzmann et al. (2013) . I would say that a speculative bubble is a peculiar kind of fad or social epidemic that is regularly seen in speculative markets; not a wild orgy of delusions but a natural consequence of the principles of social psychology coupled with imperfect news media and information channels. In the second edition of my book Irrational Exuberance I offered a definition of bubble that I thought represents the term's best use:
A situation in which news of price increases spurs investor enthusiasm which spreads by psychological contagion from person to person, in the process amplifying stories that might justify the price increase and bringing in a larger and larger class of investors, who, despite doubts about the real value of the investment, are drawn to it partly through envy of others' successes and partly through a gambler's excitement.
My definition puts the epidemic nature, the emotions of investors, and the nature of the news and information media, at center of the definition of the bubble. Bubbles are not, in my mind, about craziness of investors. They are rather about how investors are buffeted en masse from one superficially plausible theory about conventional valuation to another. One thinks of how a good debater can take either side of many disputes, and, if the debater on the other side has weak skills, can substantially convince the audience of either side. College debate teams demonstrate this phenomenon regularly, and they do it by suppressing certain facts and amplifying and embellishing others. In the case of bubbles, the sides are changed from time to time by the feedback of price changes, at the proliferation caused by price increases of reminders of basic facts that a debater might use to defend the bubble, and the news media are even better at presenting cases than are typical college debaters.
Investing ideas can spread like epidemics. Economists traditionally have not shown much interest in epidemiology, sociology, social psychology, or communications and journalism, and it takes some effort for them to consider such alien academic traditions.
There is a troublesome split between efficient markets enthusiasts (who believe that market prices incorporate accurately all public information and so doubt that bubbles even exist) and those who believe in behavioral finance (who tend to believe that bubbles and other such contradictions to efficient markets can be understood only with reference to other social sciences such as psychology). I suspect that some of the apparent split is illusory, from the problem that there is not a widely accepted definition of the term "bubble." The metaphor might suggest that speculative bubbles always burst suddenly and irrevocably, as soap bubbles seem to do, without exception. That would be silly, for history does not generally support the catastrophic burst notion. Though the abrupt ends of stock market booms in 1929, 2000 and 2007 might seem consonant with such a metaphor, these booms were reflated again before long (1933−37, 2003−2007, and 2009−present respectively) .
I think that the eventuality of a sudden irrevocable burst is not essential to the general term speculative bubble as the term is used appropriately. The metaphor may be misleading: It suggests more drama than there in fact is, imparting a sense of uniqueness to current events, which might help explain the popularity of the term by news reporters vying for the attention of readers. Just as reporters like to stir people up by reporting that an index has hit another record high (disregarding the fact that record highs occur quite often, especially since reporters hardly ever correct for inflation) so too they like to suggest the possibility of a collapse in the offing that will be remembered many years later.
I sometimes wish we had a different metaphor. One might consider substituting the term "wind trade," Dutch Windhandel a term that was used during the Tulipmania, the famous boom and burst in tulip prices in the early 1600s, sharing the reference to thin air, but not encapsulating it in a fragile bubble.
Curiously, in his Nobel Lecture in Medicine during the 2013 Nobel Week in Stockholm, James E. Rothman (2013) brought in soap bubbles too, for their analogy to the cell vesicles that his Nobel Prize research was about. He showed a movie of two soap bubbles being physically pressed together, and, surprisingly to most of us, they did not burst but merged into a single larger bubble. That's analogous to what cell vesicles can do, he said. It led me to wonder if we could say that the stock market bubble and the housing bubble of the early 2000s somehow merged into a larger bubble that created the financial crisis that burst around 2008. Imaginative thinking is fun, and maybe even inspirational, but we cannot let the bubble metaphor, or any simple metaphor, guide our models beyond the very beginnings, for any metaphor will surprise if we carried it to its absurd conclusions.
A. Efficient Markets Theory
From the very beginning, in his 1964 Ph.D. dissertation, written under the supervision of Merton Miller and Harry Roberts, Eugene Fama found that stock prices are not very forecastable. He found then that the average correlation coefficient between successive day's log price changes over the thirty Dow Jones Industrial Average stocks between 1957 and 1962 was only 0.03, which he described as "probably unimportant for both the statistician and the investor." The "efficient markets theory," widely attributed to Fama and the academic work that he stimulated, maintains that prices have a rational basis in terms of fundamentals like the optimal forecast of earnings, or assessments of the standard deviation of risk factors facing corporations.
As the theory went, because they are rationally determined, they are changed from day to day primarily by genuine news, which is by its very nature essentially unforecastable. There was an efficient markets revolution in finance, propelled by Fama's work. I was part of the movement then, less than a decade later, with my Ph. D. dissertation (1972) about the efficiency of the longterm bond market.
5 Fama (1964) , Table 10 and p. 70.
B. Alternative Views and Forecastability of Returns
These conclusions came against a backdrop of public interest then in speculative bubbles encouraged by the strong bull market in the United States: real stock prices more than quadrupled in the 16 years from 1948 to 1964. John Kenneth Galbraith's best-selling 1954 book
The Great Crash 1929, described in literary terms the follies of the boom of the 1920s and subsequent collapse and concluded that "the chances for a recurrence of a speculative orgy are rather good" 6 His book was followed up by another popular book, Charles Poor Kindleberger's Manias Panics and Crashes, 1978 , which used a similar method of recounting of human events laced with descriptions of human foolishness. Neither of them made much use of academic research in psychology or sociology, writing many years before the behavioral finance revolution, and so they came across to some as insubstantial. While both Galbraith and Kindleberger were respected academics, and the stories in their books were often compelling, many felt that their works did not have the scientific credibility of the careful data analysis that was widely taken to support market efficiency, though then again, they were provocative.
Ultimately, the question in reconciling the apparently conflicting views comes down to that of constructing the right statistical tests. It turns out that the apparently impressive evidence for market efficiency was not unimpeachable.
EXPECTED PRESENT VALUE MODELS AND EXCESS VOLATILITY
The simplest version of the efficient markets model -which maintains that stock price movements can be interpreted entirely as reflecting information about future payouts of dividends, and that hence that there is never a good time or bad time to enter the market -has, ever since the efficient markets revolution began, maintained a powerful hold on scholarly imaginations as a worthy approximation to more complex models. This form sets price equal to the expectation, conditional on publicly available information at the time of the present value of future dividends discounted at a constant rate through time:
(1) ∑ ∞ One way to test this efficient markets model is to regress the return between t and t + 1, t=1,…,n onto information variables known at time t, I t , t = 1,..,n. Often, these tests can be described approximately as tests of the "random walk hypothesis," that price changes are purely random and unforecastable. One accepts the efficient markets model if the coefficients of the information variables used to forecast future returns or price changes are not significantly different from zero. Moreover, even if the model is rejected, if the proportion of variance in returns that is predicted is small, one concludes that the model is a good approximation to reality.
These tests, and various analogues of them, are the kinds of tests of market efficiency that abounded in the literature. But the power of such tests of perpetual unforecastability of returns against an alternative that represents the world as driven entirely by temporary fads and fashions -with no fundamental reason for any change in prices -can be very low since plausible such alternatives also imply that only a tiny fraction of month-to-month returns is forecastable. Shiller (1984 Shiller ( , 1989 , Summers (1986) .
Many tests of market efficiency use daily observations of prices, and because the observations come so frequently, there may be many hundreds of observations, even if the span of the data is only a few decades. There is a tendency for many people to think that hundreds of observations must be a lot of data, but it is not necessarily a lot of data from the standpoint of distinguishing an efficient markets model from a relevant alternative.
We might, for example, be trying to distinguish using price time series data a random walk from a continuous-time first-order autoregressive process.
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In the former, whether prices are too high or too low has no ability to predict future changes. In the latter, when prices are too high relative to the mean they should tend eventually to fall (a sort of bursting of the bubble, though not a sudden catastrophic one). But, tests may have very little power to distinguish the two models, if the autoregressive parameter is close enough to one, even with a large number of observations, even with day to day or minute to minute observations. With a fixed span of data increasing the frequency of observation, even to the limit of continuous observation, does not bring power to one, Shiller and Perron (1985) , Phillips and Perron (1988 It is easy to see why short-term forecastability of price changes in investable assets should in some sense be unlikely: if investment returns were substantially forecastable from day to day, it would be too easy to get rich in a year or so by trading on these forecasts, and we know it cannot be easy to make a lot of money trading. This notion was formalized in a continuous-time framework by Sims (1990) who defined "instantaneous unpredictability" of a speculative asset price by the requirement that the R squared of the prediction from time t to time t + s goes to zero as s goes to zero. He showed under certain regularity conditions that if prices are not instantaneously unpredictable then simple rapid-trading schemes could achieve unbounded profits, which of course cannot match reality.
Taking these primal reasons to doubt that returns are forecastable over short horizons into account, the low R squared in many tests of short-run market efficiency are neither surprising nor interesting. The tests tell us only the obvious, and do not tell us about the rationality of markets beyond that people are not missing easy opportunities to get rich very fast.
I proposed that an alternative class of tests, based on the estimated volatility of returns, tests for "excess volatility" would have more power against the important alternatives to efficient markets theory, first for the bond market, rejecting the expectations model of the term structure of interest rates with U.S. and U.K. data (Shiller 1979) and then rejecting the simplest efficient markets model for the U.S. stock market (1981a).
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Independent work by Kenneth Singleton (1980) used a variance bounds test to reject the expectations model of the term structure of interest rates with U.S. data, and Stephen LeRoy and Richard Porter (1981) rejected the simple efficient markets theory for the U.S. stock market. Variance bounds tests were also used to test consumption-discount-based efficient markets models, (Shiller 1982, Lars Hansen and Ravi Jagannathan 1991) . Efficient markets models also imply bounds on the covariance between asset prices (Beltratti and Shiller 1993 Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll instead showed evidence for this newly developed and expanded theory, evidence that could be seen visually impressively in a plot of stock returns before and after the event.
But, again, the efficient markets tests, which are essentially the same as regression tests, do not have the power to tell us whether there are also bubbles affecting prices, or even whether the major component of stock price movements comes from bubbles.
The variance bounds test rejections of market efficiency could not be dismissed as correct but unimportant, as were the inefficiencies that the efficient markets literature had discovered, for they suggested that most of the variability of the aggregate stock market was not explainable as related to information about future fundamentals.
Critics of the variance bounds tests became abundant, and I endeavored at first to answer some of them, answering Terry Marsh and Robert Merton (1986) , Shiller (1986) and answering Allan Kleidon (1986) , Shiller (1988 Others continued the line of work, and much more has happened since.
A. Visual Portrayals of Excess Volatility and of the Stock Market as Forecaster
Just as event studies visually convinced many readers of some merits of efficient markets theory by showing event study plots, showing stock prices before and after an event, so too other simple plots seem to have been convincing in a different way that stock market are really not so efficient. The earlier version of this plot turned out to be the centerpiece of that paper, judging from the attention that others gave to it. Sometimes a simple plot seems to be more disturbing than a formal analysis. Looking at the data is like seeing a photojournalist's account of a historical event rather than reading a chronology: it is more immediate and invites intuitive comparisons.
To produce this figure, the present value of dividends for each date 1871-2013was computed from the actual subsequent real dividends using a constant real discount rate r = 7.6% per annum, equal to the historical average real return on the market since 1871. For this figure assumed that real dividends will grow forever from the last observed dividend, in 2013, at the same average growth rate as over the most recent ten years, 5.1% per year, which gives a 2013
value of 1292 for P*. In another, the calculations are the same but the growth rate of dividends after 2013 are taken as the geometric average growth rate over the last thirty years, 2.5% a year.
This gives a 2013 value of 669 for P*. Both of these may be contrasted with real market values of the S&P 500 index over the year 2013 ranging from 1494 to 1802.
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Should we take the latest ten years real dividend growth as a guide to the future, rather than the last 30 years or some other interval? The ten-years data are more recent, but ten years is a short time historically speaking, and the years 2003 to 2013 were unusual, starting with the aftermath of the 2001 recession, and encompassing the biggest financial crisis, and government stimulus packages, since the Great Depression. Reasonable people will certainly find reasons to differ. Worse than that, there is no objective way to forecast dividends out for decades, which is why I showed both here, as a crude indication of uncertainty today about future dividends and why it is hard to imagine that the market somehow "knows" the correct optimal forecast.
The point of showing the two different P* series is that, clearly, there is substantial uncertainty about the present value of dividends after 2013, but there is not so much variability 10 Jeremy Siegel (2005) , (2008) has made the point that since the dividend payout rate for earnings has been trending down since World War II, dividend growth should be higher in the future than it was. If companies reinvest earnings rather than pay them out, they should have more dividends to pay in the future. The validity of this theory is not without doubters. Arnott and Asness (2003) point out that perhaps lower dividend payouts may reflect managers' decision in the face of evidence that they have that earnings growth will be lower.
from year to year, as seen today, about the present value of subsequent dividends for earlier years. For earlier years, say before 1980, 2013 is so far in the future and is discounted so heavily that over a wide range of possible 2013 dividend values there is not much difference in P*. The striking fact is that by either assumption the present value of dividends (on the log scale used in the figure) looks pretty much like a steady exponential growth line, while the stock market oscillates a great deal around it. I asked in 1981: if, as efficient markets theory asserts, the actual price is the optimal forecast as of any date of the present value as of that date, why is the stock market so volatile?
Different people have different reactions to this figure, but a common reaction is that the efficient markets model looks implausible here. Why is price jumping around so much if the value it is tracking is just such a simple trend? It is not that should always look smoother through time than , for it is consistent with the model that there can be sudden shifts in price when there is important new information about subtle changes in trend. But it would seem that important new information should be something that occurs only rarely, given the smooth nature of dividends.
To see the problem for efficient markets here, imagine that the series labeled is not price but air temperature, and that is a weather forecaster's forecast of the temperature for that day t. We might be inclined to label this weather forecaster as insane. Even though in the stock market there isn't immediate feedback to the forecaster about forecast errors, still a forecaster should avoid adjusting forecasts up and down frequently, unless there is actual new information, and clearly there wasn't, not information about something that actually happened in stock market history.
One very basic thing that is learned from this figure is that the model that people essentially know the future, a model that is often suggested as an approximation, is wildly wrong in all periods. Sometimes people have suggested that the low stock prices seen in the Great Depression of the 1930s were justified because people rationally saw the damage to future real dividends caused by the Depression. But, in fact, at the worst of the stock market depression, in 1932, subsequent dividends just weren't low enough for long enough to depress by much at all.
Nothing has ever deflected real dividends for very long from a long-run growth trend of a couple percent a year.
In my original paper (1981) , I detrended the data (as is shown in a reproduction of that plot in the Scientific Basis (2013) shown on the Nobel Foundation website), thinking that it is reasonable to assume that people know the trend. Under that assumption, the efficient markets model implies that the variance around trend should be less for P than for P*, which is plainly not the case in Figure 1 . But, there was a lot of negative reaction by critics of my paper to the assumption that the trend is essentially known.
Generally, these criticisms held that there was always some reason to think that the path of dividends might eventually depart markedly from its historical growth path, and that investors were evaluating constant new information about that possibility, and that they were rational to do so even if the dividend growth path never deviated far for long from a trend. This assumes that all the fluctuations are because of genuine information about those "black swan" outlier events that might have happened in more than a century but just didn't happen. Some of the criticism had to do with the possibility that the dividend series might have a unit root, and so that the apparent smooth trend was just a chance outcome, that might not be continued into the future.
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The uncertainty about the present value of dividends after 2013 as shown in Figure 1 does highlight an important problem. At every point in history there must have been some such uncertainty about future dividends. There are always factors that creative minds can bring up that would suggest a higher or lower rate of growth of dividends in the future.
For example, can we tell an efficient markets story why the stock market was so low in the Great Depression? The present value of actual future dividends was not particularly low in the Depression, but maybe people thought that they would be low, given the extent theories of the time. Or maybe they thought that the government would eventually nationalize the stock market without compensation. One might say that it would not be manifestly irrational, not crazy, to believe such stories. But, why, then, do these stories come and go through time, causing the fluctuations in the market?
B. Variations on the Present Value Model
Of course, as we have noted, the basic notion of efficient markets does not necessarily require that discount rates are constant or that returns are not forecastable. A more general form of efficient markets would allow discount rates to depend on the time-varying one-period rate of interest:
Or, in a model proposed by LeRoy (1973) and Lucas (1978) , it could depend on consumption, using the marginal rate of substitution between consumption in successive periods as a discount rate:
where marginal rate of substitution in consumption between t and t + 1, which is, assuming constant relative risk aversion A, ρ( / A and is real per capita consumption at time t.
11 Unit root problems pose potentially serious problems for financial econometrics, see Torous (2004) , Campbell and Yogo (2006) , Cochrane (2007) . Campbell and I (1988) proposed log-differencing to recast excess volatility tests in more robust terms, West (1988) showed another elegant approach, which strengthened the evidence for excess volatility. One again, the figure reveals that there is little correspondence between any of these measures of ex-post rational price and actual stock price.
People did not behave, in setting stock prices, as if they knew the future of these variables and reacted rationally to this knowledge. Moreover, if we assume that they did not actually have knowledge the future, then one is led to wonder why the actual stock prices varied through time as much or more than the perfect foresight prices did.
There are continuing attempts to modify the consumption-based model to improve its fit, Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and Lars Hansen, in his Nobel Lecture (2013) but not yet any model that could be set alongside Figure 2 here as an inspiring vindication of efficient markets theory.
12 The parameter φ was estimated to make the average r t + φ equal the average real return on the stock market 1871−2013. The parameter A was set at four and ρ at one. The one-year interest rate is pieced together from various sources as described in Shiller (1989 Shiller ( , 2005 and real per capita consumption is from the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts.
John Campbell and John Ammer (1993) did a variation decomposition of unexpected excess returns using time series methods and U.S. postwar data. The decomposition is based on the log linearization of the present value relation used in Campbell and Shiller (1988) . The time-t innovation in the excess return over the risk free rate can be shown, with a terminal stationarity condition, as a tautology, to be the sum of three innovations:
Using this decomposition and a vector-autoregressive model in difference form, that post World War II stock market returns, Campbell and Ammer found that excess returns innovations have a standard deviation that is two or three times greater than the standard deviation of innovations in future dividend growth. Aggregate stock market fluctuations have therefore been dominated by fluctuations in predicted future returns, not by news about future dividends paid to investors.
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C. Interpretations of Return Predictability
Sociologists have a possible interpretation of these results, an interpretation that reflects a body of thought that goes back over a hundred years. The market fluctuates as the sweep of history produces different mindsets at different points of time, different zeitgeists. Emile Durkheim (1893) spoke of the "collective consciousness," that represents the shared beliefs, attitudes and moral judgments that characterize a time. Maurice Halbwachs (1925) spoke of the "collective memory," the set of facts that are widely remembered at any point of time, but that are forgotten eventually if word of mouth and active news media do not perpetuate their memory. News media tend to slant their stories towards ideas of current interest, rather than useful facts that readers no longer find interesting.
14 Surely simple forgetting of past experiences affects popular judgments.
How many people today could give any account of the financial panic of 1907, or of the housing boom of the late 1940s? One could stop anyone on the street in those times and get a ready account, now blank ignorance from almost everyone. When a bubble is building, the suppression of some facts and embellishment of other facts (just as with winning college debaters) occurs naturally through the decay of collective memory, when media and popular talk are no longer reinforcing memories of them, and the amplification of other facts through the stories generated by market events.
It is hardly plausible that speculative prices make effective use of all information about probabilities of future dividends. It is far more plausible that the aggregate stock market price changes reflect inconstant perceptions. changes which Keynes referred to with the term "animal spirits," changes that infect the thinking even of the most of the so-called "smart money" in the market. Keynes anticipated this in his 1921 Treatise on Probability, which asserted that probabilities are not precisely measurable in the sense that decision theory supposes, that there are always ambiguities. He said that because of this fundamental ambiguity, there is, in financial transactions inevitably an "element of caprice." Thirty years ago I called this as yet unmeasured factor the demand for stocks by ordinary investors, but today let us call it animal spirits, A t . A t represents the demand for stocks per share at time t everyone who is not smart money, people not really paying attention, not systematic, not engaged in research, buffeted by casually-encountered information. They are certainly the 15 Keynes (1921), p. 23. 16 http://som.yale.edu/faculty-research/our-centers-initiatives/international-center-finance/data/stockmarket-confidence. Greenwood and Shleifer (2013) examine the relation to stock price data of investor sentiment indices from six different survey sources including mine majority of investors, and suppose, to take this model to an extreme, that their opinions reflect nothing more than changing fashions and fads and idle talk and overreaction to irrelevant news stories. A t is likely to be sluggish through time (usually people don't all change their naïve opinions en masse on a dime).
The core idea here was that there are also smart money investors, who are not subject to illusion, but have to be wary of investing in the stock market because, not only are future dividends not known with certainty, but also because these ordinary investors are somewhat unpredictable and their erratic behavior could cause price changes that might produce losses in the market for the smart money if they invest too much in it. For these investors, information is predictability from day to day or month to month, consistent with efficient markets theory, even if animal spirits dominate the broad movements in P t . The price is responding to news about animal spirits, not just news about future dividends. Event study tests, described above, testing market reaction over time to news about and subsequently reality of such events as stock splits, may come out as beautifully supporting efficient markets, for much of the effect of the event on both dividends and animal spirits will be incorporated into price as soon as the event becomes news to the smart money, not when the event actually happens.
There is another important argument widely used for efficient markets, the argument that a model like (4) with an intermediate φ cannot represent a stable equilibrium because the smart money would get richer and richer and eventually take over the market, and φ would go to zero.
In fact this will not generally happen, for there is a natural recycling of investor abilities, the smart money people usually do not start out with a lot of money and it takes them many years to acquire significant wealth, meanwhile they get old and retire, or they rationally lose interest in doing the work to pursue their advantage after they have acquired sufficient wealth to live on.
The market will be efficient enough that advantages to beating the market are sufficiently small and uncertain and slow to repay one's efforts that most smart people will devote their time to more personally meaningful things, like managing a company, getting a Ph.D. in finance, or some other more enjoyable activity, leaving the market substantially to ordinary investors.
Genuinely smart money investors cannot in their normal life cycle amass enough success experience to prove to ordinary investors that they can manage their money effectively: it takes too many years and there is too much fundamental uncertainty for them to be able to do that assuredly and by the time they prove themselves they may have lost the will or ability to continue (Shleifer and Vishny 1997) .
D. Individual Stocks
These conclusions about the aggregate stock market, however, do not carry over fully to individual stocks. Paul Samuelson has asserted that: than a minority impact on the returns of individual stocks, and most of the variation in their returns comes from news about the future payouts the firms will make.
In a 2005 paper I did with Jeeman Jung, which looked at long-span data sets of stocks which had survived without significant capital changes for over half a century, we reached similar conclusions. To give a visual impression how well the efficient markets theory works for individual firms, we felt that we could display how successfully dividend growth could be predicted from the dividend-price ratio. Simple efficient markets suggests that firms with relatively low dividend price ratios should eventually, in future years, show higher dividend increases as a fraction of today's price. To make such a visual diagram in such simple terms, we sought out long-lived firms (though such a procedure risks a selection bias) We found all firms on the CRSP tape that remained alive and for which there was uninterrupted data from 1926 to 1976. There were only 49 such firms, giving us 2499 firm-year observations 1926-76. Each point on the scatter in Figure 3 shows ∑ ∆ / , the present value of future changes in dividends for the next twenty-five years (measured in dollars, and discounted by the historical average stock market return) divided by current dollar price, against , the current dividend divided by current price. Efficient markets with constant discount rate, equation (1), implies, if there is not a problem with our truncation of the present value at 25
years, that a regression line through these points should have a slope of minus one and a constant term equal to the constant discount rate. In words, if markets are efficient then a high dividend price yield for a particular stock today occurs only if people have a real reason to expect dividends to decline, and so demand to be compensated today for that future loss if they are to hold the stock today. Similarly, low dividend yield stocks must be those for which there is genuine evidence that dividends will rise in the future, eventually compensating today's investors for the low dividend return they are receiving.
The estimated slope of a line fitted through this scatter is −0.5, far from the ideal −1.0 but negative as expected. The dividend-price ratio predicts subsequent dividend changes in the right direction for these firms. Zero-dividend firms (which one can see strung out along the vertical axis) tended to have appropriately high subsequent dividend growth relative to price. The rightmost observation, which corresponds to the firm Schlumberger in 1931, a firm that had tried to maintain its dividend despite falling fortunes in the Great Depression, had a dividend payment that was 40% of its current price. People in the market then apparently figured out that the firm could not continue to pay such a dividend, that it would not be followed by another significant dividend for a very long time, and reflected that knowledge in the approximately 40% dividendprice ratio. In individual firms there is sometimes a lot of action in the ratios, and the action in fact often reflects real knowledge about future cash flows. That is an example of the kind of idiosyncratic knowledge about individual firms that makes the efficient markets model a useful approximation of reality for individual firms.
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E. Real Estate Prices
The market for real estate is larger in valuation to that of the entire stock market. According to the U.S. Financial Accounts of the United States, in 2013 the value of real estate owned by households and nonprofit organizations was $21.6 trillion, while their holdings of corporate equity shares, whether directly or indirectly, had a market value of on only $20.3 trillion.
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And yet, when I first joined with Karl Case to do joint work on real estate prices, in the 1980s, we found that hardly any scholarly research had been done on the efficiency of real estate markets. The state of knowledge about these markets was abysmal. Under the influence then of a widely-held presumption at that time that all markets must be efficient, many economists, at least in their popular pronouncements, seemed to assume that real estate markets must be efficient too.
This presumption appeared to us as quite possibly wrong, based on anecdotal evidence suggesting that real estate prices are not at all well approximated by a random walk, as is the case for stocks, but often tend to go in the same direction, whether up or down, again and again for years and years.
Case and I decided to try to test the efficiency of this market for single-family homes, but quickly discovered the importance of a stumbling black that had inhibited research: individual homes sell extremely infrequently, with interval between sales for individual homes measured not in minutes as with stocks but in years or decades. One cannot do any of the most popular tests of efficiency with such data. No runs tests or event studies would ever be possible with individual homes, and so tests of market efficiency would have to be based on indices.
There were some home price indices of sorts available then, but they had serious problems.
There was a median sales price of existing homes, published by the National Association of
Realtors, but it often appeared to jump around erratically. It was just the median price of whatever homes were selling now, was not controlled for anything, and it appeared that different kinds of homes sold in different months. It had a very strong seasonal, which we suspected arose because people who sold in the summer, in phase with the academic year and the job market, typically had bigger or higher-quality homes which had higher prices.
There was also at that time a "Price of New Homes Sold," also called "Constant Quality based on different homes every quarter, whatever and wherever homes had just been built that quarter.
So Case and I constructed our own "repeat sales" home price index based on an inspiration of his (Case 1986 ) and then on a method we devised that inferred price changes only from the change in prices of individual existing homes (Case and Shiller 1987 . We showed how a quarterly index could be computed even if homes sell much less frequently than quarterly.
We discovered that Case's inspiration was largely anticipated by Baily, Muth and Nourse (1963), but we had a number of improvements, taking better account of heteroscedasticity. Later, I made the index arithmetic and value weighted, as are the most prominent stock price indices (Shiller 1991 A plot of our quarterly national index corrected for CPI inflation is shown in Figure 4 , along with the Census Constant Quality Index, also converted to real terms.
Simply producing these data and looking at a plot, as shown in Figure 4 , yields some surprises. First of all, the home price data are generally extremely smooth through time, except for a small amount of seasonality. Home prices do indeed go through years of price increases and then years of price decreases. So, the random walk model of home price behavior is just not even close to being true for home prices (Case and Shiller 1988) . Home prices might seem to be described as in accordance with model (4) above with the parameter φ extremely large, so that the smart money, who might go in and out of the market quickly in response to news, is hardly a factor. Secondly, while it was not apparent when we first computed these indices, it is clear from these data from today's vantage point that there was a huge boom in home prices after 2000 that was not very visible from the Census Constant Quality Index. Why is the boom and bust in home prices after 2000 so much more prominent in our repeat sales index? New homes are built where it is possible and profitable to build them, typically outside congested urban areas where price swings may be most pronounced, and so their level through time may be more nearly determined by simple construction costs. Thus, our data collection revealed not only market inefficiencies, but much bigger price swings as well.
The inefficiency that we documented in single family home prices must be related to market conditions, and so efficiency must be improvable with changes in market institutions. The inefficiency of the market for single family homes relative to that of the stock market must be partly traced to the relatively much higher cost of trading in that market. It is much more costly for professional traders to trade in and out of the market for single family homes to profit from predictable price movements. It is difficult to do short sales of overpriced individual homes.
Buying and selling individual homes may not work well for professionals also because of high carrying costs, low rental income, moral hazard of the renters who have relatively little incentive to care for the property, and difficulty keeping up with all the local factors that might change the demand for individual houses, so that remote institutional investors would risk being picked off as ignorant losers. Some institutional investors are in the news recently thinking they can survive and make money in this market. We will see if they succeed.
We thought that the market efficiency could be improved if an index of home prices could be made tradable. Working with Standard & Poor's, and with the people in our company
MacroMarkets LLC, we helped the Chicago Mercantile Exchange with plans to set up futures markets based on our indices for ten U.S. cities. These markets were launched in 2006, and are still trading today, albeit with nothing close to the volume of trade that we hoped to see in these markets.
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We hoped that the creation of these new markets would change the nature of prices in real estate markets, with price discovery that made the price of homes behave more like the random walk that efficient markets theory suggests.
Real estate markets remain wildly inefficient all over the world. We can only look forward to the day when liquid markets support more trade that might permit something rather closer to the efficient markets that theorists have expected.
To achieve such improvements in efficiency, in real estate markets, in stock markets, or in any speculative markets, it is most helpful to understand the causes of market inefficiency, and that requires serious study from the broad perspective afforded by an array of other sciences outside of economics.
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
The behavioral economics revolution, which brings psychology and other social sciences into economics, saw its first beginnings in the 1980s, but did not attract public attention until the 1990s. Richard Thaler and I started our behavioral economics workshops at the National Bureau There are a number of surveys of the behavioral finance literature, notably Baker and Wurgler (2011) , Barberis (2003) , Shefrin (2008) , Shiller (2003) and Shleifer (2000) .
The behavioral finance revolution seemed to take its beginnings from the evidence of market inefficiency that was by then starting to look significant. Once we acknowledge that the efficient markets theory has no special claim to priority for price determination, we can look more sympathetically to other factors to understand market fluctuations. The anomalies literature points indeed to some oddball factors as playing a role. Benos and Jochec (2013) showed that patriotism affects stock prices, in that U.S. stocks with the words "America(n)" or "USA" in their names earn an abnormal return of 6% a year during wartime. Saunders (1993) found that the weather in New York affects stock prices. If such silly things as these affect stock prices, it should be no surprise if more plausible but half-baked theories (about the central bank, fiscal policy, energy prices, the future of capitalism, and on and on) would also affect market prices.
Most stock market investors do not pay much attention to fundamental indicators of value.
We might argue that their inattention is in some sense rational, since there is a cost to collecting information. Christopher Sims has devised a model of rational inattention (2003) . But, it is hard to believe that their inattention is systematic and thoughtful. The dominance of mutual funds that charge fees but consistently underperform the market is itself a puzzle for efficient markets theory (Gruber 1996) .
A. Early History of Behavioral Finance
Behavioral finance until the 1980s was mostly relegated to the community of investment analysts who did not generally attract notice in academia, and who did not generally draw on research from the social sciences. There were however some gems from this period. Notable among these 24 Graham and Dodd (2002) p. 276.
Keynes gave a view of speculative markets that was ahead of its time. In his 1936 book The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. Keynes described speculative markets as akin to a newspaper competition he saw offered by a local newspaper to its readers. His metaphor is widely referred to as Keynes "beauty contest" theory of the stock market. Each reader was invited to submit from a page with one hundred photos of pretty faces a list of the six of them he or she thought prettiest. The winner would be the one whose list most closely corresponded to the most popular faces among all the lists of six that readers sent in. Of course, to win this contest a rational person would not pick the faces that personally seem prettiest.
Instead one should pick the six faces that one thinks others will think prettiest. Even better, one should pick the faces one thinks that others think that others think prettiest, or one should pick the faces one thinks that others think that others think that others think prettiest. The same is true with stock market investing. Keynes thought that "there are some, I believe, who practice the fourth, fifth and higher degrees," 25 further degrees of removal from reality than was embodied in equation (4) A key Keynesian idea is that the valuation of long-term speculative assets is substantially a matter of convention, just as it is with judgments of facial beauty. Whatever price people generally have come to accept as the conventional value, and that is embedded in the collective consciousness, will stick as the true value for a long time, even if the actual returns fail for some time to live up to expectations. If an asset's returns are carefully tabulated and disappoint for long enough, people will eventually learn to change their views, but it may take the better part of a lifetime. And many assets, such as owner-occupied homes, do not have unambiguously measured returns, and a mistaken "conventional valuation" based on a faulty popular theory can persist indefinitely. The presumed investment advantages of, say, living in an expensive landintensive single-family home near a big city rather than renting a cheaper and more convenient apartment in a high-rise there may just not exist, and most people will never figure that out.
Conventional valuation can be a very subtle phenomenon at any point of time, reflecting popular theories of the time that are perceived by many, who have never studied the theories, as reflecting professional wisdom. In a beauty contest, people have even less incentive to consider the validity of this wisdom, since they view it as substantially entrenched in others' thinking. I am reminded, for example, of Modigliani and Cohn's (1979) study showing that inflationinduced biases in conventional accounting practices caused a massive understatement of earnings, a study which allowed them to call roughly, within a few years, the historic bottom of the stock market in 1982. The absence of immediate reaction to their study was just the kind of thing one might expect to see in a beauty contest world, since no one expected anyone else to react much to their paper.
B. The Blossoming of Behavioral Finance after 1980
The idea that speculative prices are somehow uniquely authoritative, as the best possible judgment of true value, still has its popular appeal even today. But, it has lost its unique claim on the attention of economic theorists. Theoretical models of speculative markets that are analogous to Keynes' beauty contest theory, that stress the expectation of reselling to other people who may have optimistic beliefs, have been offered by Harrison and Kreps (1978) , Morris (1996) (Kyle 1985 , De Long et al. 1990 ) and Campbell and Kyle (1993) have begun to replace models with all rational agents.
Moreover, there are models of financial markets that replace the assumption of rational expected-utility-maximizing agents with alternative models of human behavior, such as Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) . Prospect theory, which is a theory of human choice in the face of risk that is based on experimental evidence in the psychology laboratory, is not a theory of rationality in the traditional sense, for it recognizes violations of the basic axioms of rational behavior (Savage, 1954) .The human behavior prospect theory describes is vulnerable to the arbitrariness of psychological framing; insignificant changes in context or suggestion can produce profound differences in human behavior.
Barberis, Huang and Santos showed (2001) that prospect theory with investors who derive direct utility from fluctuations in the value of their wealth can help explain the excess volatility of stock market returns. A "house money effect" can help make bubbles grow even bigger, in analogy to gamblers at casinos, after they have won some money, become very risk tolerant with that money because they frame it as somebody else's money that they can afford to lose, Thaler and Johnson. Investors' "narrow framing" (Barberis, Huang and Thaler 2006) and the disposition to sell winners and hold losers (Shefrin and Statman 1985) can explain other evidence against efficient markets.
The field of psychology offers many other principles of human behavior that have been shown to be relevant for evaluating the efficient markets theory. For example, there is evidence that a general human tendency towards overconfidence causes investors to trade too much (Odean, 2000) and CEOs to squander internally generated funds on pet projects (Malmendier and Tate, 2005) . There is a tendency for investors to be overly distracted by news stories (Barber and Odean, 2008) and to overreact to cash dividends (Shefrin and Statman, 1984) .
Financial theory has also advanced to allow us a better understanding of the effects of the ambiguity regarding probabilities, the fundamental difficulties in placing numerical values for probabilities, that Keynes spoke of, Bewley (2002) , Bracha and Brown (2013) .
Psychologists have documented a tendency for people to anchor their opinions in ambiguous situations on arbitrary signals that are psychologically salient even if they are obviously irrelevant (Tversky and Kahneman 1974) .
Neuroscience has begun to understand how the human brain handles ambiguity. Hsu et al. The rapid progress we are now seeing in neuroscience will likely yield new insights into the ambiguity, animal spirits and caprice that Keynes and others since him have stressed.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL INNOVATION
The financial institutions that we have today are the product of centuries of experience with the volatility of speculative asset prices, with the important information discovery that these market prices can reveal, as well as the potential for erratic behavior in these markets. The reliability of these markets in revealing genuine information about fundamentals is not terrific, but it is certainly not negligible either, and the reliability might be improved through time with better 26 Huettel et al. (2006), p. 765. financial institutions. Efficient markets should be considered a goal, not an established fact. The financial institutions that we have are the results of experimentation designing around this experience; the institutions we will have in the future depend on our continuing experimentation and redesign.
Like mechanical engineering, financial engineering should pay attention to human factors, to make devices that serve people well with full consideration of human talents and foibles. As this experience accumulates, with each successive financial crisis, and each improvement in information technology, financial innovation can make these institutions work better for humankind.
For example, the very invention, centuries ago, of stock markets, has created an atmosphere for investing that, while it regularly produces the excesses of bubbles, creates an incentive for people to launch exciting new enterprises, to keep up to date on relevant information, and to protect themselves if they want from the inevitable risks of those very bubbles.
As David Moss (2002) has chronicled, a general limited liability statute covering all stock market investors was not such an obviously good idea when the world's first such law was passed in New York in 1811, but it turned out to be of fundamental importance for investors' psychology. By clearly forbidding suing shareholders for a company's sins, it limited the downside risk of investing to psychologically manageable proportions (no more worries that any one of your investments could explode and land you in debtors' prison), and it permitted portfolio diversification to proceed without exhaustive investigation of each company's management.
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The stock market became an exciting place, like a gambling casino, but tied to business reality rather than mere amusement, and it was a place where investors could diversify and limit their risks. It therefore was highly effective in attracting capital for enterprise.
More recently, people have been experimenting with other details of the stock markets, such as insider trader rules, risk retention rules, capital requirements, and other factors. These interact with human psychology in ways that can improve market functioning but whose effects cannot be accurately foretold from any received theory. The ideas in these books, and associated articles, are diverse, go in many directions, and have to be judged as beginnings of ideas. They may look awkward just as the earliest designs of aircraft did; their later incarnations may look less so.
The overarching theme of this work of mine is that we need to democratize and humanize finance in light of research on human behavior and the functioning of markets (Shiller 2011) .
Democratizing finance means making financial institutions work better for real people, dealing with the risks that are most important to them individually, and providing opportunities for inspiration and personal development. Humanizing finance means making financial institutions interact well with actual human behavior, taking account of how people really think and act.
Lionel Robbins, with his 1932 book An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic
Science has had the honor of inventing the most common definition today of economic science, of the unifying core idea that defines this science. He wrote then:
The economist studies the disposal of scarce means. He is interested in the way different degrees of scarcity of different goods give rise to different ratios of valuation of them, and he is interested in the way in which changes in conditions of scarcity, whether coming from changes in ends or changes in means -from the demand side or the supply side -affect these ratios.
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The importance of prices in allocating scarce resources is an idea whose beginnings go back at least to Adam Smith in the 18 th century, with his "invisible hand," and there was a certain wisdom in Robbin's framing of the entire field of economics around this idea. This wisdom still today is not fully apparent to the untrained public. Most people do not appreciate that our all of our economic activities and all of our pleasures and satisfactions, and those of subsequent generations, are ultimately guided by prices of scarce resources as formed in the markets.
There is a problem, however, with the interpretation of economics that Robbins so persuasively gave. For his definition appeared to cast the economic problem exclusively as about 28 Robbins (1932), p. 15. scarcity of production resources, like energy and food, rather than also about scarcity of human intellectual and psychological resources. He casts the problem as man against nature, when in fact much of the economic problem is dealing with man against himself.
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Long-term asset prices as they are observed today, prices of stocks, bonds, real estate, and commodities, and prices of derivative products such as futures, swaps and options, and of other institutions like long-term insurance, are especially significant for economics, and especially problematic, since the scarcity that these prices represent is one that is never really objective and directly revealed today. Their levels are influenced by expectations of the distant, and generally nebulous, future. The market prices of speculative assets at any given time reflect, as is commonly asserted, both tastes and technology of that time. But they also reflect expected tastes and technology of the future, the likelihood of discovery of new sources of resources or the technology to develop them. They also reflect sociology and social psychology, and anticipated future changes in these, in government policy such as taxation, and in other primary forces, such as changes in the inequality of incomes and likely social and governmental reactions to these, and the potential threat of wars and other catastrophes, and the likely use of and policy towards the assets in such times.
Fischer Black, in his 1984 presidential address before the American Finance Association, offered a new definition of market efficiency: He redefined an "efficient market" as "one in which price is within a factor of 2 of value, i. e., the price is more than half of value and less than twice value. . . . By this definition, I think almost all markets are efficient almost all of the time."
30 And yet, even assuming he is somehow right, the existing efficient markets theory remains the fundamental framework from which much economic policy decisions, and decisions to innovate or not, are made. No one would seriously propose the elimination of stock markets even if we all accepted Fischer Black's impression as fact. So, why should we not consider other risk markets, markets that have not come in to being yet just through accidents of history and timing of associated technological breakthroughs?
Institutions can be redesigned so that they reframe people's thinking, to the longer term and to things that are better subjects for their attention, by making markets for risks that are better 29 See for example Mullainathan and Shafir (2013) .
30 Black (1986 Consider also the new benefit corporations that are now offered in twenty U.S. states. They are amalgams of for-profit and non-profit corporations, fundamentally changing the mental framing that investors are likely to have of their investments in them, and encouraging both investors' excitement and more idealistic thinking about these investments.
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The participation nonprofit business form that I advocated (2012), which makes nonprofits psychologically more similar to equity-financed business, would, if it is ever implemented, increase philanthropy and make it more effective.
These are only the beginning of the financial innovations that we might expect to see in our future, helped along by our improved understanding of behavioral finance, of mathematical economics, and steadily improving information technology. In particular, it would seem that great benefit can be derived by expanding the scope of our financial markets, to allow trading of risks that really matter.
We might benefit from the expansion of trading to include trading of other indices that have only recently come to be measured but that reflect real and important risks. I have already alluded to the futures market for single family homes that was started at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange in 2006, and if that market becomes more successful it will eventually provide price discovery for a value of great personal importance to individuals, and might lead to a cash market for real estate that is not so woefully inefficient. The home futures market, if it became more successful, would facilitate the creation of many more risk management products, such as home equity insurance (Shiller and Weiss 1998) or mortgages with preplanned workouts (Shiller 2012 , Shiller, Wojakowski et al. 2013 .
Had there been a well-developed real estate market before the financial crisis of 2008 it would plausibly have reduced the severity of the financial crisis, because it would have allowed, even encouraged, people to hedge their real estate risks. The severity of that crisis was substantially due to the leveraged undiversified positions people were taking in the housing market, causing over fifteen million U.S. households to become underwater on their mortgages, and thus reducing their spending. There is no contradiction at all in saying that there are bubbles in the housing market and yet saying that we ought to create better and more liquid markets for housing.
Even further, I along with others have argued that a market for claims on the flow of gross domestic product, or other large macroeconomic aggregates should be developed, to help countries share their risks, Shiller ( , 2003 Shiller ( , 2008 , Athanasoulis and Shiller (2000, 2001) , 31 See http://benefitcorp.net/. Kamstra and Shiller (2009) , or markets for other significant economic variables like occupational incomes to share their livelihood risks , Shiller and Schneider 1998 , Shiller 2003 .
Had The development of inflation-indexed bonds, which have gradually grown in importance over the last half century worldwide, are an important past success, but as yet an incomplete one.
Such markets, and other indexing institutions, might be enhanced by further deliberate changes in psychological framing. If inflation-indexed units of account, which create an easier way in our language to refer to indexed quantities, were created and widely used, they would help people around their money illusion which inhibits intelligent design of contracts around the real outcomes that really matter. I have been advocating the proliferation of these units of account where they first began in Chile (2002), and in the United States (2003) , and the United Kingdom 32 These are defined in in terms of a daily settlement formula involving both the change in settle price and another index representing a cash flow.
33 See Their widespread use might have helped prevent the real estate bubble that preceded the current financial woes, a bubble that was likely helped along by the widely-held impression that single family homes have historically shown high real capital gains when in fact over the last century the gains overall have been only nominal and hence illusory (Shiller 2005) .
We want such innovations, if not exactly the ones I and others have been advocating to date, because their predecessor innovations, the financial institutions we already have today, have brought such prosperity, despite the occasional big disruptions caused by bubbles and financial crises. There is no economic system other than financial capitalism that has brought the level of prosperity that we see in much of the world today, and there is every reason to believe that further expansion of this system will yield even more prosperity.
The patterns of behavior that have been observed in speculative asset prices are consistent with a view of market efficiency as a half-truth today and at the same time with a view that there are behavioral complexities in these markets that need to be met with properly engineered financial innovations and financial regulations.
Changes in our financial institutions that take the form of creative reinventions in the kinds of risks traded, that change the psychological framing of the things traded, that change our social relations with business partners and adversaries, can make financial markets less vulnerable to excesses and crashes and more effective in helping us achieve our ultimate goals. 36 Chile created its Unidad de Fomento (UF) in 1967, still in use there today, http://valoruf.cl/.
